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four areas of computation in which in-
centives play a crucial role: resource al-
location, knowledge integration, peer 
production and interaction, and secu-
rity and privacy. 
Resource allocation 
Allocating  scarce  resources—from 
bread to bytes—is a fundamental pro-
cess that permeates economics and, in-
deed, society. Participants declare their 
perceived value for the resource and the 
market computes the best (for example, 
value-maximizing)  allocation  and  the 
prices that participants should pay.
One decentralized prescription for 
resource allocation is an auction. Clas-
sical auctions emphasize simple rules 
for setting allocations and prices, which 
can be determined manually. Many of 
the largest marketplaces in the world, 
including  financial  exchanges,  are  at 
their core based on these centuries-old 
procedures. In one week of March 2008, 
the U.S. treasury sold, largely through 
manual means, more than $22 billion 
in three-month treasury bills.
Modern computer systems can sup-
port  much  richer  and  more  flexible 
mechanisms.  Governments  use  auc-
tions to allocate property rights such as 
wireless spectrum (with worldwide pro-
ceeds exceeding $100 billion by the end 
of 2001). Combinatorial auctions allow 
bidders  to  express  values  for  bundles 
of goods—for example, in assigning a 
higher value to two adjacent properties 
than  the  sum  of  the  values  assigned 
to  each.
12  Generalized  combinatorial 
auctions  with  rich  and  natural  forms 
of  expressiveness—volume  discounts, 
side constraints, and bundling require-
ments, among others—are used to de-
termine billions of dollars of spending 
within  the  supply  chain,  even  though 
the problem is NP-hard. For example, 
they are used to source truckload-trans-
portation logistics for Procter & Gamble, 
Walmart, and Target.30
Advertising is a business based on 
allocating attention, one of the scarcest 
and most valuable of resources. Media 
companies capture attention by provid-
ing information or entertainment and 
coMpaNIeS aNd INdIvIduaLS are using computer 
networks to conduct increasing amounts of their daily 
business. Web search engines auctioned some $10 
billion of ad space in 2007, accounting for almost half 
of all online advertising revenue. sales at Amazon.
com were $4.13 billion in the first quarter of 2008, 
including a fast-growing revenue stream from selling 
Web services to other e-commerce companies. At eBay, 
sales reached $15.7 billion in the second quarter, with 
84.5 million active users. 
This explosion of large-scale e-commerce poses 
new computational challenges that stem from the 
need to understand incentives. Because individuals 
and organizations that own and operate networked 
computers and systems are autonomous, they will 
generally act to maximize their own self-interest—a 
notion that is absent from traditional algorithm 
design. In this article, we provide an overview of
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typically sell a fraction of that attention 
to advertisers.
Historically,  advertising  sales  fea-
tured straightforward allocation rules 
and  manual  negotiations.  But  now 
more aspects of advertising, including 
its sale, delivery, and measurement, are 
being automated. Web-search engines 
such  as  Google  and  Yahoo!  have  led 
the way, selling space beside particular 
search queries in continuous dynamic 
auctions worth billions of dollars an-
nually.
Auctions and exchanges for all types 
of online advertising—including ban-
ner and video ads—are commonplace 
at present, and they are run by startups 
and  Internet  giants  alike.  Advertisers 
can buy not only space but also contex-
tual events—such as clicks from a spe-
cific user on a specific property at a spe-
cific time—or, more generally, bundles 
of contextual events. An ecosystem of 
third-party agencies has grown to help 
marketers  manage  their  increasingly 
complex ad campaigns.
The rapid emergence of new modes 
for selling and delivering ads is fertile 
ground  for  research,  both  from  eco-
nomic  and  computational  perspec-
tives.25  Edelman  et  al.15  and  Varian31 
model how advertisers bid in search-
ad  auctions.  Essentially,  the  advertis-
ers raise their bids until they reach a 
point of indifference between staying 
where they are and swapping with the 
advertiser above them on the page. The 
authors show that this bidding strategy 
forms the basis of a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium  and,  in  a  nice  example 
where theory aligns with practice, that 
real bidding behavior is largely consis-
tent with the model.
A  number  of  questions  drive  re-
search in ad auctions and exchanges. 
What mechanisms increase advertiser 
value or publisher revenue? What user 
and  content  attributes  contribute  to 
variation in advertiser value? How can 
bids  for  different  contingencies  (im-
pressions,  clicks,  or  conversions)  be 
integrated  and  optimized  over  time? 
What constraints on supply and budget 
make  sense?  How  should  advertisers 
and publishers bid? How can publish-
ers and advertisers incorporate learn-
ing and optimization (while trying to 
balance exploration and exploitation)? 
How do practical constraints such as 
real-time  delivery  affect  design?  How 
is  automation  changing  the  advertis-
ing industry? More information can be 
found  in  the  Proceedings of the  Work-
shop on Ad Auctions series.33
Knowledge integration
The eliciting and aggregation of infor-
mation  from  diverse  and  frequently 
self-interested  sources  is  in  gener-
al  called  “knowledge  integration,” 
with  a  particular  case  being  “price 
discovery”—a  side  effect  of  market-
based resource allocation. The balance 
point of supply and demand reveals the 
negotiated value of the resource.
In  some  cases,  the  value  revealed 
in prices can rival or eclipse the value 
of trade. For example, the price of an 
asset that pays $1 if a category-5 hur-
ricane hits Florida in 2009 can be seen 
as a probabilistic forecast of this cata-
strophic event. The value of an actual 
and more accurate forecast could run 
into the millions of dollars.
A  “prediction  market”  is  a  market 
designed  primarily  for  price  discovery 
rather than resource allocation, and this 
alternate focus leads to a different pri-
oritization of design goals. For example, 
the  market  operator  may  be  happy  to 
pay for the information it seeks, instead 
of enforcing neutral or positive revenue. 
Trading is not the end goal but a means 
to  the  end  of  acquiring  complete,  ac-
curate,  and  timely  information.  For 
example,  the  Iowa  Electronic  Market 
forecasts the outcomes of political elec-
tions, and intrade.com predicts events 
ranging from the outbreak of avian flu 
to Osama bin Laden’s capture.
Liquidity  and  expressiveness  play 
important roles in prediction markets. 
If a trader with information cannot re-
veal it to the market, either because illi-
quidity prevents matching with anoth-
er trader or because the market does 
not support the way in which the trader 
wants to express information, then the 
mechanism may fail.
Designing prediction markets to im-
prove liquidity and expressiveness pos-
es substantial though not insuperable 
computational  challenges.
25  Liquid-
ity can be addressed through the use 
of automated market makers that are 
always willing to buy and sell at some 
prices and that adjust prices dynami-
cally to ensure a bound on their worst-
case loss.18, 26 Expressiveness is gained 
at an often-severe computational cost, 
thus placing a difficult computational 
problem  in  the  lap  of  the  auctioneer 
striving  to  bring  matched  traders  to-
gether or of the market maker trying 
to (implicitly) maintain an exponential 
number of prices.10 In some instances, 
there is a reasonable and useful com-
promise  between  expressiveness  and 
computational complexity.11
A  more  direct  means  of  obtaining 
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structure into peering societies.27 
Reputation  and  trust  metrics  have 
an  important  role  to  play  in  Internet 
commerce,29  yet  finding  the  right  de-
sign  can  be  quite  a  subtle  problem. 
For example, one study suggests that 
good  reputations  of  sellers  on  eBay 
are sometimes the result of a badly de-
signed feedback protocol. A seller, who 
has the “last move,” can punish a buyer 
who leaves negative feedback; the sell-
er may respond with negative feedback 
of his own about the buyer.8 
Recent  work  has  formalized  the 
challenges of providing provably non-
manipulable  trust  metrics  in  graph-
theoretic terms. Suppose that players 
are nodes and that player j can choose 
to lay down an edge (j, k) to another 
player  k  (possibly  weighted),  indicat-
ing a trust relationship; and suppose 
further  that  nodes  can  misrepresent 
trust  information  and  create  new 
(“fake”) nodes. Various algorithms can 
be defined to compute pairwise trust 
between nodes, and their informative-
ness and manipulability can be com-
pared. For instance, the EigenTrust al-
gorithm21 is vulnerable to Sybil attacks; 
one player can lay down multiple fake 
nodes that pump reputation flow in its 
direction. Other algorithms are more 
robust. Consider, for instance, defin-
ing pairwise trust i-j (i’s trust of j) as 
the  number  of  hops  on  the  shortest 
path from i to j in an unweighted di-
rected  graph.  Player  j  cannot  reduce 
the i-j path length and improve the i-j 
trust by adding fake nodes and (direct-
ed)  edges,  as  these  nodes  and  edges 
can only affect shortest paths that flow 
through j and thus must leave the i-j 
path unaffected.4 A similar argument 
establishes that node j cannot reduce 
the i-k trust for any node k that i trusts 
more  than  j.  The  only  paths  affected 
would be those that go through j and 
therefore ultimately reach nodes less 
trusted by i than j. 
One  outstanding  challenge  in  the 
area of trust metrics is to find a satis-
factory  definition  of  informativeness; 
current  axiomatic  approaches  appear 
unsatisfactory in this regard. With such 
a definition in hand, tensions between 
robustness and informativeness could 
be explored and perhaps also allow for 
mitigating factors such as the presence 
of other-regarding and altruistic actors 
within peering systems. 
payment  of  a  fixed  amount  does  not 
motivate the expert to be either truth-
ful or careful, let alone to actively seek 
out new information. A “scoring rule” 
is a payment function that depends on 
the expert’s prediction and the actual 
outcome in such a way as to motivate 
truthful participation.32 Shared scoring 
rules can form the basis of self-financ-
ing (budget-balanced) wagering mech-
anisms  to  obtain  multiple  individual 
forecasts.23  Indeed,  the  line  between 
scoring  rules  and  markets  becomes 
blurred.  For  example,  the  most  com-
mon  automated  market  maker  used 
for prediction markets can be viewed 
as a sequential shared scoring rule.18
Rating systems are forums for gath-
ering  subjective  opinions  on  a  variety 
of things, such as movies, restaurants, 
or  trading  partners.  Unlike  forecasts, 
rating and reputation systems have no 
fundamental  truths  on  which  to  base 
rewards. Although rating systems may 
provide  personalized  recommenda-
tions or advice, the incentives of raters 
may not align with these goals. Real rat-
ing systems do provide considerable val-
ue, despite the persistence of spam and 
pollution. Designing rating systems that 
are resistant to manipulation is an im-
portant challenge, requiring both good 
algorithms and good economics.28
Peer Production and interaction
“Peer  production,”  a  term  coined  by 
Benkler,6  refers  to  large-scale  col-
laboration that is not based on price 
signals and occurs outside of the typi-
cal hierarchies and reward structures 
provided by firms. Salient examples of 
successful artifacts of peer production 
include  Wikipedia  and  Linux.  Social 
production,  a  more  general  phenom-
enon,  describes  the  output  of  social 
relations—for example, the videos that 
people upload to YouTube and the con-
tent on social-networking sites such as 
Facebook. Taken together, these activi-
ties make up an energetic swath of the 
e-commerce landscape, both because 
of the opportunities to promote non-
traditional production through appro-
priate feedback, trust, and accounting 
mechanisms  and  because  of  oppor-
tunities  for  targeted  advertising  and 
monetization efforts.
How can it be that peer production 
seems  to  succeed  despite  the  widely 
accepted  economic  model  of  people 
as selfish and rational actors? Nontra-
ditional motivations, such as hedonic 
pleasure from doing useful work and 
civic  pride  in  observing  community 
and societal norms, seem to be a part 
of  the  story.  Indeed,  the  established 
field  of  behavioral  economics  seeks 
to  explain  people’s  social  or  “other-
regarding”  preferences.16  Monetary 
rewards can actually lead to the crowd-
ing  out  of  social  motivations  and  to 
increasingly  selfish  behavior.  In  one 
noted example, when a country moved 
from a system of voluntary blood do-
nations to one with small payments it 
found that donation rates went down 
instead of up.17 
Despite  positive  examples  of  peer 
production, there is little formal knowl-
edge  about  the  design  of  successful 
peer-production  systems.  Pertinent 
methodologies seem necessarily more 
indirect than those of economic mecha-
nism design,20 given that actions are in-
trinsically voluntary. One challenge is to 
design systems that observe behaviors 
with a view to learning (social) prefer-
ences.  Can  environments  be  usefully 
modulated  through  appropriate  con-
straints and affordances (for example, 
with moderator rights and other tiers), 
the  assignment  of  rewards  (say,  gold 
stars),35 and the ability to aggregate and 
disseminate  information  about  peers 
(such  as  through  scoreboards  and  so-
cial context)? 
Lessons  learned  from  peer-to-peer 
file sharing suggest that incentive con-
siderations will remain important even 
in  the  presence  of  other-regarding 
preferences.  Early  protocols  failed  to 
provide appropriate incentives for the 
uploading of files, and systems such as 
Gnutella suffered from a large amount 
of free-riding.3 The BitTorrent protocol 
addressed this problem by limiting a us-
er’s download rate according to upload 
history,  thus  mitigating  incentives  to 
free-ride. But such tit-for-tat during bi-
lateral peering introduces its own mar-
ket  inefficiencies;  for  example,  users 
cannot contribute upload resources in 
return for credit for later downloads un-
less centralized trackers are employed. 
Hybrid systems that allow for account-
ing and some form of currency may be 
of interest, though they have associated 
challenges with regard to dynamic sta-
bility.22 There are interesting directions 
as  well  in  the  introduction  of  social review articles
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security and Privacy
Research  in  security  and  privacy  has 
been  a  central  theme  in  academic 
computer  science  for  more  than  30 
years. But although many clever algo-
rithms,  protocols,  and  devices  have 
been  rigorously  analyzed,  experimen-
tally deployed, and even commercially 
developed, few of these solutions are in 
widespread use. 
In  2001,  Anderson  initiated  a  new 
security-research  direction  by  ques-
tioning  the  tacit  assumption  that  se-
curity is primarily a technical problem. 
“[I]nformation insecurity is at least as 
much due to perverse incentives” as to 
technological failure, he said.“ Many of 
the  problems  can  be  explained  more 
clearly and convincingly using the lan-
guage of microeconomics: network ex-
ternalities,  asymmetric  information, 
moral  hazard,  adverse  selection,  li-
ability dumping, and the tragedy of the 
commons.”5 In the years since Ander-
son’s  seminal  paper  appeared,  most 
aspects of security and privacy research 
have been suffused with economic con-
siderations. We confine ourselves here 
to a brief discussion of the role of eco-
nomics in user privacy, spam, and digi-
tal content distribution. More informa-
tion can be found, for example, at the 
Web site of the Workshop on Econom-
ics of Information Security.34
That  the  increase  in  e-commerce 
has coincided with an erosion of con-
sumer  privacy  seems  paradoxical.  Af-
ter all, the ability to shop without hav-
ing  to  stand  face-to-face  with  others 
in  a  store  seems  privacy  enhancing. 
Encryption,  pseudonyms,  electronic 
cash, and numerous other techniques 
purport  to  enable  online  consumers 
to protect their personal information 
and their identities. In practice, how-
ever,  the  trend  has  been  for  online 
merchants to ask for more information 
about their customers and for custom-
ers, even sophisticated ones who claim 
to value privacy, to provide this infor-
mation  when  asked.  Acquisti1  offers 
the  following  explanation:  “Behind  a 
privacy intrusion there is often an eco-
nomic trade-off. … [I]ndividuals want 
to avoid the misuse of the information 
they pass along to others, but they also 
want to share enough information to 
achieve satisfactory interactions; orga-
nizations want to know more about the 
parties  with  which  they  interact,  but 
they do not want to alienate them with 
policies deemed as intrusive.”
Behavioral  economics  combined 
with  experimental  psychology  yields 
the following general explanation for 
privacy  erosion.  Even  “sophisticated” 
consumers who value privacy will often 
compromise it to improve their posi-
tion  in  an  ongoing  transaction.  They 
know  that  loss  of  control  over  their 
private information poses a long-term 
threat, but they cannot assess the long-
term  risk  accurately  enough  to  com-
pare it to the short-term gain in the on-
going transaction.2
Although  not  strictly  an  “e-com-
merce”  issue,  privacy  in  public  data-
bases9 is relevant to this discussion. In 
publicly  available,  sanitized  aggrega-
tions of sensitive data about individu-
als, the canonical example of which is 
a  census  database,  there  is  a  natural 
tension  between  utility  of  the  collec-
tion and privacy of the individuals, and 
communities often opt for utility. 
Among all forms of unwanted com-
munication, email spam has received 
the most attention. But the phenome-
non also includes link spam (which de-
grades search quality), shilling (which 
degrades  reviewer  and  recommender 
systems),  and  click  fraud.  Given  this 
rogue’s  gallery,  there  is  widespread 
agreement that the incentive structure 
of  next-generation  network  services 
must  be  designed  more  carefully.13 
Techniques  for  incentive-based  pre-
vention  of  unwanted  communication 
include pricing via processing,14 atten-
tion bonds,24 and click-based learning 
algorithms.19
Nowhere is the inadequacy of a pure-
ly  technical  approach  to  information 
security  clearer  than  in  the  realm  of 
copyright enforcement. Digital-content 
distributors do have some control over 
the prices of their products and the flex-
ibility with which purchased products 
can be used (for example, the extent to 
which they can be copied, shared, or 
modified), but although more flexible 
products may fetch higher prices they 
may also show dampened sales. Taking 
into account the fact that some digital 
environments  are  highly  permeable 
(for example, they have higher rates of 
social contact or network bandwidth), 
Bergemann et al.7 show the following:
If users are homogenous, there is a    ˲
critical permeability level up to which 
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all users buy the product, and the opti-
mal price and flexibility levels decrease 
as  permeability  increases.  When  per-
meability rises above the critical value, 
the number of users who buy decreas-
es, and the optimal price and flexibility 
stay constant.
A  platform  vendor  who  also  sells    ˲
digital content (which he licenses from 
copyright owners) will find it optimal 
to allow very flexible use by platform 
customers  and  to  set  a  low  price  for 
content; most of the vendor’s profit is 
from platform sales. Copyright owners’ 
revenue is low, because prices are low 
and sharing of content is common.
Tension between the platform ven-   ˲
dor and copyright owner is observed in 
the real world. In 2005, the Financial 
Times quoted a music executive as say-
ing, “Our music is not something to be 
given away to sell iPods.”
conclusion
Nearly all mass-market services—email, 
Web  search,  social  networks,  recom-
mendations, user content, and ad net-
works, for example—seem beset by at-
tempts to manipulate and distort. New 
services, such as the semantic Web, are 
assumed to be immune only while they 
remain niche. Yet to date the design of 
Internet protocols and services, includ-
ing  monetization  efforts,  have  often 
been guided by technology rather than 
economics; and users have been mod-
eled in caricature as either cooperative 
or malicious, the later to be dealt with by 
security measures. In truth, few users are 
benevolent and fewer still are vandals. 
Even the most vilified of participants—
spammers—are  acting  in  response  to 
rational economic considerations. Un-
derstanding how to align the incentives 
of participants with systemwide objec-
tives is fundamental to the design of the 
next generation of Web-scale services. 
Increasingly, design teams will require 
dual  expertise  in  social  science  and 
computer science, adding competence 
in  economics,  sociology,  and  psychol-
ogy  to  more  traditionally  recognized 
requirements such as algorithms, inter-
faces, systems, machine learning, and 
optimization.
In this article we focused on compu-
tational  challenges  in  Internet-based 
(specifically Web-based) commerce. Yet 
people are starting to use smartphones 
and other handheld devices to do much 
of what they used to do with Internet-
connected  desktop  or  laptop  PCs.  To 
what extent these handheld devices will 
ultimately behave like networked PCs is 
unclear, and thus we leave to a future ar-
ticle the needed discussion of computa-
tional challenges in mobile commerce.
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